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Environmental Law
Travis M. Trimble*
In 2021,1 the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Alabama, in an issue of first impression, concluded that the United
States is not a “person” under the contribution provision of the Oil
Pollution Act (OPA),2 and therefore the provision did not waive the
sovereign immunity of the United States.3 For this and other reasons a
plaintiff could not recover in contribution from the United States for the
plaintiff’s costs of cleaning up an oil spill, even where the plaintiff
alleged the spill was the result of the sole negligence of the United
States.4 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia issued a dispositive ruling in the long-running dispute between
Alabama and Georgia over the United States Corps of Engineers’
(Corps) allocation of water from Lake Lanier to municipal water supply
in the metro Atlanta area.5 The court granted summary judgment to
the Corps and affirmed that the Corps’ decision to allocate water for
that purpose, including by direct withdrawals of water from the lake,
and the Corps’ accompanying Environmental Impact Statement
regarding that decision, was reasonable.6 Finally, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ruled that a plaintiff
had successfully stated claims against multiple defendants related to
the supply, use, and disposal of toxic chemicals used in the manufacture
of carpet that resulted in the contamination of surface water in the

*Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Mercer University (B.A. 1986);
University of North Carolina (M.A. 1988); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D.
1993).
1. For an analysis of last year’s environmental law during the Survey period, see
Travis M. Trimble, Environmental Law, 2020 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 72 MERCER L. REV.
1135 (2021).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2720 (1990).
3. Savage Services Corp. v. U.S., 522 F. Supp. 3d 1114, 1127 (S.D. Ala. 2021).
4. Id.
5. In re ACF Basin Water Litigation, No. 1:18-MI-43-TWT, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151587 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2021).
6. Id. at *5.
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Coosa River Basin in northwestern Georgia and ultimately the
contamination of the drinking water supply of Rome, Georgia.7
In Savage Services Corporation v. United States,8 oil barges being
pushed by the plaintiff’s inland towing vessel on the TennesseeTombigbee Waterway were damaged in a lock operated by the United
States Corps of Engineers.9 The damage to the barges, according to the
plaintiff, was due to the sole negligence of Corps’ employees, resulting
in a spill of oil into the lock and causing the plaintiff to incur over four
million dollars in damages, including over three million dollars in
cleanup costs to remove oil from the lock. The plaintiff was strictly
liable for the cleanup costs pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act.10 The
plaintiff sued the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA)
11 and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)12 for contribution or
indemnity.13
This set of facts, which the plaintiff alleged created a claim for
contribution against the United States for harm under federal
admiralty law, also created a crack through which the plaintiff’s claims
fell, according to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama.14 It granted the United States’ motion to dismiss
the plaintiff’s claim for contribution as to the oil spill cleanup costs on
the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the claim due to the
United States’ sovereign immunity.15
At the outset, the court noted that to recover from the United States,
the plaintiff had to identify a waiver of sovereign immunity that would
allow its claims.16 Both the SAA17 and the FTCA18 contain such waivers.
The United States conceded that with respect to the plaintiff’s damages
not related to the oil spill cleanup, the plaintiff’s claims could proceed

7. Johnson v. 3M, No. 4:20-cv-8-AT, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197688 (N.D. Ga. Sept.
20, 2021).
8. Savage Services Corp., 522 F. Supp. 3d at 1114.
9. Id. at 1116.
10. Id. at 1118.
11. 46 U.S.C. § 30901 (2006).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2013).
13. Savage Services Corp., 522 F. Supp. 3d at 1116.
14. Id. at 1119–20.
15. Id. at 1123.
16. Id. at 1117.
17. Waiver of sovereign immunity for claims against the United States, see 46 U.S.C.
§ 30903(a) (2006); see also Savage Services Corp., 522 F. Supp. 3d at 1117.
18. Waiver of sovereign immunity for claims against the United States, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (2013); see also Savage Services Corp., 522 F. Supp. 3d at 1126.
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under the SAA.19 However, with respect to the plaintiff’s claim for
damages resulting from the oil cleanup, the United States argued that
that claim was governed by the OPA,20 which does not allow a
responsible party like the plaintiff to bring a claim for contribution
against the United States. 21
The plaintiff contended that it could pursue a contribution claim for
negligence against the United States under OPA’s contribution
provision, which provides that “a person may bring a civil action for
contribution against any other person who is liable or potentially liable
under this Act or another law.”22 The plaintiff argued that because the
SAA allowed it to sue the United States to the same extent it could sue
a private party, the SAA constituted “another law” under the OPA’s
contribution provision.23 Thus, even if the plaintiff’s claim was governed
by the OPA, the OPA provided a waiver of sovereign immunity for the
basis of the plaintiff’s lawsuit, the SAA.24
However, the court concluded as a matter of first impression that the
United States is not a “person” within the meaning of the OPA’s
contribution provision.25 The OPA defines person as “an individual,
corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission,
or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.”26 The plaintiff
argued that a person under the OPA includes the United States because
the term “State” should be interpreted to mean the United States and
because “State” and “United States” are defined interchangeably
elsewhere in the OPA.27

19. Savage Services Corp., 522 F. Supp. 3d at 1118.
20. The purpose of the OPA, passed after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, was to “provide
quick and efficient cleanup of oil spills, compensate victims of such spills, and internalize
the costs of spills within the petroleum industry.” Id. (citing In re Settoon Towing, LLC,
859 F.3d 340, 344 (5th Cir. 2017)).
21. Id. Under the OPA, “any person owning, operating, or demise chartering [a]
vessel” is a responsible party. 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (32) (2018). A responsible party “from
which oil is discharged . . . into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or
the exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages . . . that result
from such incident.” 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1990).
22. Savage Services Corp., 522 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2709 (1990)
(emphasis in original)).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1120–21.
26. Id. at 1119–20 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2701(27) (2018)).
27. Id. at 1120. “‘United States’ and ‘State’ mean the several States of the United
States . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (36) (2018).
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The court disagreed.28 First, the court agreed with the United States’
argument that had Congress intended the term “State” to include the
United States in the OPA, the statute would not use the terms
separately “in numerous places,” as it does, to refer to the United States
as a separate entity from a State.29 Second, the court explained that
with respect to oil spills, the OPA had repealed a contribution provision
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,30 which also had allowed
vessel owners or operators to recover oil spill remediation costs when
those costs were incurred as a result of the sole negligence of the United
States (among other things).31 Thus, Congress intended to remove the
possibility that responsible parties under the OPA could recover
remediation costs in contribution from the United States.32 Third,
courts have recognized a “well-settled presumption that the term
‘person’ in a statute does not include the sovereign in common usage,
absent an affirmative showing of congressional intent to the contrary.”33
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that if the OPA’s
contribution provision were not construed to include the United States
as a person from whom contribution could be had, it would conflict with
the SAA, which explicitly did include the United States in its
contribution provision.34 While the court acknowledged that the two
statutes were in conflict on this point, the court concluded that the
conflict could not be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor for two reasons.35
First, the OPA is more recent, having been enacted in 1990 where the
SAA was enacted in 1920.36 The court explained that “Congress’s intent
to effect an implied repeal . . . when a later statute conflicts with or is
repugnant to an earlier statute; or when a newer statute covers the
whole subject of the earlier one, and clearly is intended as a
substitute.”37 The court concluded that with respect to oil spills, both of
those circumstances were present in the conflict between the OPA and
the SAA.38 Second, the OPA is a “specific, detailed statute” with respect

28. Savage Services Corp., 522 F. Supp. 3d at 1120.
29. Id.
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(i) (2018).
31. Savage Services Corp., 522 F. Supp. 3d at 1120–21.
32. Id. at 1120.
33. Id. at 1121.
34. Id. at 1122.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
619 F.3d 1289, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010)).
38. Id.
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to oil spills, where the SAA is more general, implying the OPA’s
“mandatory and exclusive nature” in dealing with oil spills.39 For these
reasons, the court resolved the conflict between the two statutes in
favor of its reading that the OPA did not include the United States as a
person for contribution purposes.40
Further, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the OPA’s
“savings” provision allowed the plaintiff to pursue its contribution claim
under the SAA.41 The OPA provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this Act, this Act does not affect-(1) admiralty and maritime
law; or (2) the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States
with respect to civil actions under admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction . . . .”42 The court concluded that the language “except as
otherwise provided by this Act” applied to the plaintiff’s claim,
returning it to the court’s earlier interpretation that the OPA did not
allow for a contribution claim against the United States.43
Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiff could not bring its
claim under the FTCA because the FTCA does not apply to claims
falling under admiralty law.44
Thus, under the court’s application of law to this narrow set of
circumstances, that is, an oil spill into navigable waters, a plaintiff who
is strictly liable for cleaning up the oil under the OPA cannot recover its
costs from the United States, even assuming the United States is solely
at fault for the spill.
In the case of In re ACF Basin Water Litigation,45 the Georgia court
resolved a long-running dispute between the states of Alabama and
Georgia over Georgia’s use of water from Lake Lanier to satisfy the
water supply needs of Atlanta.46 The court concluded that the Corps’
adoption of an updated Master Manual in 2017, which allowed for
Georgia water supply providers to withdraw water directly from Lake
Lanier in order to meet the water supply needs of Atlanta and
surrounding areas through 2030, was not arbitrary or capricious.47 It
also concluded that the Corps’ Environmental Impact Statement that

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 1122–23.
Id. at 1123.
Id.
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2751(e) (1990)).
Id. at 1124–25.
Id. at 1127.
No. 1:18-MI-43-TWT, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151587 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2021).
Id. at *6–8.
Id. at *55.
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accompanied the 2017 Master Manual was not arbitrary or capricious.48
As a result, the court granted summary judgment to the Army Corps of
Engineers and the Georgia water supply defendants and denied
summary judgment to Alabama and other parties who challenged the
2017 Manual.49
The lawsuits resolved in this case began in 2017.50 The state of
Alabama, and the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) and other
environmental plaintiffs (Environmental Plaintiffs), in separate
lawsuits challenged the Corps’ 2017 updated ACF River Basin Water
Control Manual, which allocated additional water from Lake Lanier to
water supply for Atlanta and the surrounding region and the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that accompanied it.51 Relevant
to the present case,52 Alabama’s suit claimed the Manual and EIS
violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),53 the Water Supply
Act of 1958,54 and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).55 The
Environmental Plaintiffs’ suit challenged the Manual and EIS under
the APA, the Water Resources Development Act of 2007,56 NEPA,57 and
the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.58
The State of Georgia, Atlanta Regional Commission, the City of
Atlanta, Cobb County-Marietta Water Authority, DeKalb County,
Forsyth County, Fulton County, the City of Gainesville, and Gwinnett
County (Georgia Water Providers) intervened as defendants in both
cases.59
The Corps operates five reservoirs along the Chattahoochee River,
which rises in north Georgia, flows through Atlanta, and forms a large
part of the border between Alabama and Georgia before flowing through
north Florida and emptying into Lake Seminole at the Florida-Georgia

48. Id. at *34–35, *62–63.
49. Id. at *63.
50. Id. at *6–8.
51. Id.
52. On May 22, 2020, the court granted summary judgment to the Georgia Water
Provider defendants on the portions of Alabama’s and the Environmental Plaintiffs’
claims brought under the Clean Water Act. Id. at *25.
53. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (1966).
54. 43 U.S.C. § 390b (1958).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969).
56. Pub. L. No. 110-114, 121 Stat. 1041.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969).
58. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-667e; In re ACF Basin Water Litig., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151587, at *7.
59. Id.
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border.60 Water from Lake Seminole becomes the Apalachicola River,
which flows through north Florida into the Gulf of Mexico. This water
management system is known as the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
(ACF) River Basin. The largest reservoir is Lake Lanier, created by the
Buford Dam (the Buford Project).61
By two statutes: the Rivers and Harbors Acts of 194562 and 1946,63
the Corps was given the authority to build and operate the Buford
Project.64 Reservoirs in the ACF River Basin generally were authorized
by Congress for purposes including navigation, hydroelectric power,
national defense, recreation, and industrial and municipal water
supply.65 The 1946 Act authorized the construction of the Buford Project
for downstream water supply and flood control, although the Buford
Project was also to be managed for the other purposes as well, including
power generation.66 The laws required the Corps to issue manuals
governing its operations of the ACF basin projects to meet the needs of
the projects authorized by Congress.67
In the following years, the Corps increased the amount of Lake
Lanier’s water allocated to municipal water supply uses due to growth
in the Atlanta area.68 This water was withdrawn by users downstream
from the Buford Dam. In 1989, the Corps decided to reallocate a specific
amount of water storage in Lake Lanier for municipal water supply
downstream, with water to be withdrawn directly from Lake Lanier.
The Corps claimed the authority to do so under the Water Supply Act of
1958.69 Alabama filed suit against the Corps to stop the reallocation,
and Georgia and Florida intervened,70 thus beginning the long-running
tri-state water wars. This lawsuit was stayed by a “live-and-let-live”
agreement whereby the Corps withdrew its plan for permanent
reallocation and direct withdrawal of water from Lake Lanier but kept
the ability to continue to allow reasonable increases in the amount of
water allocated to municipal water supply downstream of Lake Lanier
on an ad hoc basis.71
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at *8.
33 U.S.C. § 544b (1945).
Pub. L. No. 98-606, 98 Stat. 3169.
In re ACF Basin Water Litig., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151587, at *10.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *11–12.
Id. at *10–12.
Id. at *12–14.
Id. at *16 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 390b (2016)).
Id.
Id. at *17.
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In 2000, Georgia asked the Corps to modify its operation of the
Buford Project to meet Georgia users’ projected water supply needs
until 2030, including withdrawal of 408 million gallons per day from the
Chattahoochee River and 297 million gallons per day directly from Lake
Lanier.72 The Corps denied the request on the ground that it did not
have the authority under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1946 and the
Water Supply Act to make such a reallocation of water without
congressional approval.73 Georgia filed suit challenging that denial, and
other suits followed. These lawsuits were eventually consolidated into a
multi-district litigation, in which the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida ruled that the Corps had exceeded its
authority by its “de facto” reallocation of water storage to accommodate
water supply uses.74 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
district court lacked jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure
Act in the case because the Corps had not taken a “final agency action”
required for a legal challenge.75 The Eleventh Circuit also ordered the
Corps’ denial of Georgia’s request in 2000 for permanent reallocation of
water remanded to the Corps, because the court concluded the Corps
did have the authority under the Rivers and Harbors Act to allocate
water for municipal water supply uses.76
In 2012, the Corps concluded that it did have the authority to grant
Georgia’s request for water reallocation but would have to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement addressing the change.77 The Corps
completed a draft of its updated Master Manual reflecting the
reallocation, and the accompanying EIS, in 2015. Although the EIS
identified potential adverse environmental effects, including
“substantially adverse” effects on fish and aquatic resources in the
Chattahoochee River, the Corps concluded that it could provide over
250,000 acre-feet of water storage for direct withdrawal from Lake
Lanier without seriously affecting other purposes of the Buford Project.
The Corps adopted the updated Master Manual reflecting the new
water allocation on March 30, 2017, and the plaintiffs’ lawsuits
followed.78

72. Id. at *18.
73. Id.
74. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
75. In re ACF Basin Water Litig., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151587, at *20 (citing In re
MDL-1824-Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 644 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2011)).
76. Id. at *20–21 (citing In re MDL-1824-Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 644 F.3d
at 1160).
77. Id. at *22–23.
78. Id. at *23–25.
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In May 2020, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants
as to the portions of Alabama’s and NWF’s lawsuits based on the Clean
Water Act (CWA)79 and judgment.80 The parties all filed motions and
cross-motions for summary judgment as to the remaining claims.81 At
issue in the present case was Alabama’s challenges to the Master
Manual based on four grounds.82
First, Alabama claimed the Manual violated the Water Supply Act of
1958 by allocating what amounted to 23.7% of the Buford Project’s
conservation pool to the Georgia Water Providers’ direct withdrawals.83
Alabama contended that this reallocation was in violation of the Water
Supply Act’s requirement that any modification of a reservoir project
that would “seriously affect” the project’s purposes or would involve
“major structural or operational changes” must be approved by
Congress.84
The court ruled against Alabama on this claim.85 The court explained
that the terms in the statute on which Alabama based this claim were
not defined in the statute and were themselves ambiguous, and
therefore “the agency’s interpretation [of the terms’ meaning] is entitled
to ‘controlling weight’ as long as that interpretation is reasonable.”86
The Corps had determined that the terms “major” and “seriously” “refer
to changes and impacts that fundamentally depart from congressional
intent for a project[,]” and could not be measured only by the size of a
reallocation of water by itself.87 The court explained that the Corps had
demonstrated that it could allocate additional water to the water supply
via direct withdrawals from Lake Lanier without requiring a major
structural or operational change to the Buford Project and without
seriously affecting any authorized purpose of the Project or of the ACF
system.88 The court concluded that the Corps demonstrated that its
decision was reasonable, and thus the Corps was entitled to deference.89
Second, Alabama contended that the Corps violated the Rivers and
Harbors Acts of 1945 and 1946 by unlawfully abandoning purposes
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1361(1987).
80. In re ACF Basin Water Litig., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151587, at *25.
81. Id. at *25–26.
82. Id. at *29.
83. Id. at *29–30.
84. Id. at *31–32 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 390b(e) (2016)).
85. Id. at *34–35.
86. Id. at *32–33 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of State Utility Consumer Advocates v. F.C.C.,
457 F.3d 1238, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006)).
87. Id. at *36.
88. Id. at *37–39, *43–45.
89. Id. at *45.
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authorized for the Project by Congress and by improperly prioritizing
water supply over other authorized purposes of the Buford Project,
including power generation, navigation, and flood control.90 Here, too,
the court concluded that the Corps’ determination that it had the
authority to allocate more water from Lake Lanier to the needs of the
municipal water supply was reasonable, as was the Corps’ conclusion
that it could do so without significantly impacting other authorized
purposes of the Project or other ACF basin projects.91 The court noted
that “[t]he Corps has significant discretion to balance the often
competing purposes at its multi-purpose reservoirs.”92
Third, Alabama contended that the Corps’ EIS violated NEPA by
comparing the impacts of the reallocation of water to conditions that
had been present in 1989, when the Corps’ issued its first draft of the
updated Manual, prior to NEPA’s passage.93 Alabama contended that
the Corps should have measured the impact of the reallocation of water
by comparing to the environment as it existed in 1958, when the
previous manual was adopted.94 The court concluded that the Corps had
properly described the “no action” alternative under NEPA as the
environmental conditions existing at the time the reallocation of water
was proposed (for example, the environmental conditions that would
continue to exist if the proposed federal actions were not taken).95 These
conditions in turn were the proper baseline against which to measure
impacts of the water reallocation.96 The court explained that “[i]n
Alabama’s proposal, the Corps would have to describe an environment
that has not existed for decades and analyze the management practice
not as they actually exist but as a hypothetical set of conditions. Like
many other districts, the [c]ourt holds that the interpretation of the ‘no
action’ alternative as the current level of activity used as a benchmark
is correct.” 97
Fourth, Alabama contended that the Corps violated the APA by
failing to explain why the Corps did not follow its established policy of
ensuring that its project operations did not degrade water quality.98
Alabama argued that the APA’s mandate that agencies make
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at *45–46.
Id. at *46.
Id. at *47.
Id. at *48.
Id.
Id. at *48–49.
See id. at *49.
Id. at *50.
Id. at *50–51.
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reasonable decisions required the Corps to acknowledge the change in
policy and offer a reasonable explanation for the change.99 The court
noted, however, that Alabama admitted that the Corps explained in the
EIS and the Record of Decision that “it was adopting the preferred
alternative despite the potential impact to water quality because the
‘substantial benefits to water supply . . . outweigh the potentially
adverse water quality impacts associated with increased water supply
uses.’”100 Thus, the court concluded, “even if the Corps’ action was a
departure from its guidance, the Corps adequately explained the
reasons for its substantive action” and “[t]he [c]ourt defers to ‘an
agency’s ultimate findings as well as drafting decisions like how much
discussion to include on each topic . . . .”101
The court also granted summary judgment to the Corps and the
Water Provider defendants on the NWF’s claim that the Corps’ EIS
violated NEPA.102 The NWF argued that the EIS violated NEPA in
several ways: (1) by narrowing the fish and wildlife conservation
purpose to limit consideration of alternatives to the reallocation of Lake
Lanier’s water in the amount the Corps approved;103 (2) by using the
Corps’ management practices of the ACF basin in 1989, which the NWF
contended were already environmentally damaging, as the “no action”
baseline against which to measure the impacts of the proposed
reallocation;104 (3) by failing to consider additional alternatives;105 and
(4) by failing to analyze the “direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts” of
the reallocation.106
The court rejected each of these grounds.107 As to the first, the court
explained that NEPA only required the Corps to include a purpose and
need statement for the EIS.108 The contents “‘is left to the agency’s
expertise and discretion, and courts defer to the agency if the statement
is reasonable.’”109 Further, the court noted that the purposes of the
Corps’ ACF basin operations are defined by Congress, and while the
99. Id. at *51.
100. Id. at *52.
101. Id. (quoting Black Warrior Riverkeeper Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 833
F.3d 1274, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016)).
102. Id. *54, *62.
103. Id. at *54–55.
104. Id. at *56–57.
105. Id. at *57–58.
106. Id. at *59–60.
107. Id. at *60–62.
108. Id. at *54–55.
109. Id. at *55 (quoting Citizens for Smart Growth v. Peters, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1215,
1223 (S.D. Fla. 2010)).
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Corps did include fish and wildlife as a purpose and need of the Buford
Project in the EIS, it was not required to treat that purpose as co-equal,
or indeed give it any particular weight in comparison, with other
purposes of the Project.110
As to the second ground, the court rejected it for a similar reason
that it rejected Alabama’s challenge to the “no action” baseline the
Corps used for the EIS.111 The court stated that “[o]nce again, the
Corps’ judgment and selection of a baseline that represented no change
from current management is deserving of deference, consistent with
NEPA, and neither arbitrary nor capricious.”112
On the third ground, the court concluded that the ten alternatives
examined by the Corps in the EIS “enabled reasoned choices
considering the objectives the Corps had identified” and thus its choices
of alternatives to the reallocation of water at the level it authorized was
not arbitrary or capricious.113
Finally, the court disagreed with the NWF’s contention that the
Corps had failed to analyze the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts
of the reallocation.114 The court found, to the contrary, that the Corps
had “exhaustively detailed” the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts
and followed NEPA’s requirements in all necessary respects in making
its decision.115 Also, while the NWF argued that the Corps left it to the
State of Georgia to figure out how to mitigate adverse impacts of the
additional water withdrawals, the court noted that federal agencies
“can recognize that other entities are in the best position to take
appropriate action[,]” and that “[t]he agency need not delay adopting its
preferred alternatives while those other entities choose ‘what
mitigating measures they consider necessary.’”116
The court summed up its decision by stating that “[i]n the absence of
an agreement among Georgia, Florida[,] and Alabama, there is no
better alternative [,] [d]ecades of deferral and delay due to litigation
should end.”117

110. Id. at *55–56.
111. Id. at *56.
112. Id. at *57.
113. Id. at *59.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *60.
116. Id. at *60–61 (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
353 (1989)).
117. Id. at *63.
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In Johnson v. 3M,118 the plaintiff and potential members of a class of
plaintiffs were purchasers of water from the Rome Water and Sewer
Division in Rome, Georgia.119 The plaintiff sued numerous defendants
related to the carpet manufacturing industry in Dalton, Georgia,
including suppliers of chemicals to carpet manufacturers, carpet
manufacturers, the City of Dalton d/b/a/ Dalton Utilities, and the
Dalton Whitfield County Solid Waste Authority,120 claiming that these
defendants caused or contributed to the discharge of chemicals used in
carpet manufacturing known as Per-and polyfluoroalkyl substances
(PFAS) into waterways in the Upper Coosa River Basin, including the
Oostanaula River, from which the City of Rome withdraws its drinking
water.121
PFAS is a group of chemicals used in carpet manufacturing.122 PFAS
is stable and repels oil and is used to make carpet both water and stain
resistant. As a result of these properties, PFAS does not break down in
the environment. It is also toxic and is linked to adverse health effects
including cancer and developmental defects in fetuses. PFAS is water
soluble, and thus drinking water is a significant source of exposure to
PFAS for humans.123
Defendants named in plaintiff’s lawsuit comprised four groups: the
Supplier Defendants, who manufacture and supply PFAS to carpet
manufacturers; the Manufacturer Defendants, who manufacture carpet
in and around Dalton, Georgia; the Dalton Whitfield Solid Waste
Authority (DWSWA), which operates two landfills that accepted solid
waste from the Manufacturer Defendants and which discharged
leachate from the landfills to the Dalton water treatment facility
(publicly owned treatment works, or POTW), and Dalton Utilities, an
entity of the City of Dalton.124
Dalton Utilities operates the Dalton POTW and a Land Application
System (LAS) of liquid waste disposal where wastewater is treated and
then sprayed onto land rather than returned to a waterway.125 Under
its permit, Dalton Utilities must operate the LAS as a “no discharge”
system, meaning that no discharges of pollutants to surface water.
Dalton Utilities also has a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

No. 4:20-cv-8-AT, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197688 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 2021).
Id. at *15–16.
For a list of all parties, see id. at *1–7.
Johnson, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197688, at *16–18.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *15.
Id. at *16–18.
Id. at *17.
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System (NPDES) General Stormwater Permit which prohibits
discharges of wastewater and contaminated stormwater from the LAS.
Dalton Utilities in turn enacted its own rules for users of the LAS,
which prohibit a user from discharging any wastewater to the LAS
which would cause the “pass through” of pollutants from the LAS to
surface water.126
Approximately 90% of the wastewater that is disposed of by the LAS
originates from industrial users, primarily carpet manufacturers.127 The
Manufacturers’ wastewater discharge contains PFAS. A characteristic
of PFAS is that they “resist degradation during treatment processing at
the POTW and [thus] accumulate in the LAS.”128
The EPA has established a drinking-water limit of seventy parts per
trillion for certain PFAS chemicals.129 Studies done in 2006 found PFAS
levels well above this level in surface water downstream of the LAS,
and a 2009 study found “dangerously high levels” of PFAS in Rome’s
drinking water.130 In 2016, the City of Rome determined that its
existing water treatment system was incapable of removing PFAS from
the city’s drinking water. Rome installed a temporary filtration process,
and to pay for it and a planned permanent upgraded filtration system
capable of dealing with PFAS, Rome has implemented a surcharge on
the price of water that will increase at least 2.5% per year.131
The plaintiff filed suit in 2019, claiming personal injury, property
damage, and economic harm resulting from the PFAS contamination of
Rome’s drinking water.132 Causes of action included claims under the
Clean Water Act against Dalton Utilities and the DWSWA, and for
willful misconduct and negligence against all defendants except Dalton
Utilities, negligence per se against all defendants except Dalton
Utilities and the Supplier Defendants, and public nuisance against all
defendants.133
Of particular relevance to the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the
plaintiff alleged that all defendants “have known for years that PFAS
cannot be removed from the industrial wastewater and that the

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at *17–19.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *15.
Id. at *20–21.
Id. at *22.
Id. at *22–24.
Id. at *24–25.
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conventional treatment processes and land application do not remove
these chemicals prior to discharge” to surface waters around the LAS.134
The court’s present order dealt with motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim brought by defendants as to several of the plaintiff’s
claims.135 The court ruled that plaintiff’s amended complaint stated
claims against defendants, except as follows: the court ruled that the
plaintiff failed to state a claim for nuisance against Dalton Utilities,
failed to state a claim for negligence against the Supplier Defendants,
and failed to state a claim for negligence per se against two of the
Supplier Defendants.136 Rather than summarize all of the court’s
rulings in its lengthy opinion, this Article summarizes aspects of some
of those rulings that practitioners might find particularly interesting.
I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IS NOT AN IMPROPER COLLATERAL ATTACK ON
THE GEORGIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DIVISION’S PERMITTING
DECISIONS.
Dalton Utilities moved to dismiss the complaint’s CWA citizen-suit
claim against it on the ground that its LAS is permitted by the Georgia
Environmental Protection Division (EPD) as a nonpoint source and that
Dalton Utilities had not violated its LAS permit.137 Dalton Utilities
argued that the CWA’s National Pollution Elimination Discharge
System Permit (NPDES) program only requires permits for point
sources, and that EPD’s regulations implied that if EPD issued an LAS
permit, EPD had necessarily determined that the LAS was not a point
source that required an NPDES permit. The plaintiff’s CWA claim
alleging that Dalton Utilities’ LAS discharged pollutants without an
NPDES permit thus failed because Dalton Utilities was in compliance
with its LAS permit and was not required to have an NPDES permit.138
The court rejected this argument.139 Among other things, the court
concluded that the LAS was a point source.140 The court followed other
courts that had concluded that spray heads used for the land
application of wastewater fit the regulatory definition of a point source,
and that the wastewater that thereafter migrated from the LAS into

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at *19–20.
Id. at *26–27.
Id. at *8–9.
Id. at *49.
Id. at *49–51.
Id. at *50.
Id. at *58.
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surface water constituted a discharge from a point source.141 It pointed
out that even if an LAS is a nonpoint source when it operates properly,
“When the system fails . . . with resulting discharge . . . the escape of
liquid from the confined system is from a point source.”142
The court also concluded that Dalton Utilities could not claim
protection under the CWA’s permit shield provision,143 which provides
that if the holder of an NPDES permit discharges pollutants in
accordance with its permit, the permit shields the holder from CWA
liability.144 The court explained that Dalton Utilities did not hold an
NPDES permit and that the permit shield protection did not extend to
an LAS permit.145 The court noted that “[p]laintiff’s Complaint
adequately alleges that the LAS system does not operate according to
its design as a ‘no discharge system,’ but instead Dalton Utilities’
operation of the LAS system results in discharges of PFAS[,]” to surface
waters, which would require an NPDES permit that Dalton Utilities did
not have.146
With respect to other grounds for dismissal of the plaintiff’s CWA
claim against Dalton Utilities, the court also ruled that it would not
abstain from asserting jurisdiction under the Burford abstention
doctrine,147 that the plaintiff’s complaint stated a claim under the CWA
for spills of sewage from the LAS,148 and that the plaintiff’s claim was
not barred by the statute of limitations.149

141. Id. at *55–58 (citing Flint Riverkeeper Inc. v. Southern Mills, Inc., 276 F. Supp.
3d 1359, 1367–68 (M.D. Ga. 2017)); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368,
370 (10th Cir. 1979); Reynolds v. Rick’s Mushroom Service, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 449, 457
(E.D. Pa. 2003).
142. Johnson, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197688, at *57 (citing Earth Sciences, Inc., 599
F.2d at 374).
143. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2019).
144. Johnson, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197688, at *60.
145. Id. at *61–62.
146. Id. at *63.
147. Id. at *66. The Supreme Court of the United States explained that federal courts
could elect to abstain from issuing rulings or holdings that could interfere with State
regulatory schemes or enforcement actions. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943);
see generally Johnson, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197688, at *65–66.
148. Id. at *67.
149. Id. at *73.
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II. PLAINTIFF STATED A CLAIM AGAINST THE DWSWA UNDER THE CWA

FOR CAUSING OR CONTRIBUTING TO THE DISCHARGE OF PFAS FROM THE

DALTON UTILITIES’ LAS

The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the DWSWA discharged its
landfill leachate containing PFAS to the Dalton POTW, where the
chemicals could not be removed from the leachate, and from where the
PFAS “pass[ed] through” to the LAS, where they were sprayed onto
land as part of the land application of wastewater.150 From the LAS, the
PFAS then migrated into surface water that became the drinking water
supply for Rome.151 The plaintiff alleged that the DWSWA caused
violations of Dalton Utilities’ sewer use rules, its NPDES general
stormwater permit, prohibiting discharges of stormwater mixed with
industrial wastewater or contaminated stormwater, and section 307(d)
of the CWA,152 which prohibits the discharge of pollutants that pass
through and are discharged from a POTW into surface waters.153
The DWSWA contended that it did not cause a violation of Dalton
Utilities’ NPDES stormwater permit.154 First, the DWSWA argued that
because a claim based on the “pass through” of pollutants requires a
plaintiff to provide a discharge in violation of a permit, and the
plaintiff’s claim against Dalton Utilities was based on a discharge
without a permit, the DWSWA could not have caused a violation of a
permit.155 The court concluded that the complaint did allege that the
DWSWA discharged PFAS into the Dalton POTW, which then exited
the LAS into surface waters in violation of Dalton Utilities’ permits.156
Because the court was required to accept those allegations as true for
the purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the court would not dismiss the CWA claim on that basis.157
The DWSWA also argued that the permit violation on which the
plaintiff based his CWA claim was the discharge itself of stormwater
mixed with industrial wastewater but not the discharge of any
particular pollutant in the wastewater.158 Since the DWSWA did not
cause the discharge itself, it argued that it did not cause a violation of
the CWA. The court concluded, however, that “[p]laintiff has alleged
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at *76–77.
Id. at *75.
33 U.S.C. 1317 (1987).
Johnson, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197688, *75–76.
Id. at *81.
Id. at *81–82.
Id. at *82.
Id.
Id.
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that violations of [Dalton Utilities’] General Stormwater permit are
caused by the presence of the PFAS from the DWSWA’s discharges to
the POTW and the LAS.”159 Again, the DWSWA’s argument appears to
be based on the presumption that it could presume that the LAS would
function as it was intended, which would result in no discharge to
surface waters. Thus, the PFAS in its wastewater was not in and of
itself a violation of any permit term or regulation when its wastewater
was ultimately applied on land.160 The court pointed out, though, that
one actor such as the DWSWA could be a cause of another’s violation of
a permit due to the “pass through” of pollutants without having to be
the sole cause of the violation.161 The court pointed to reasoning from
the Eighth Circuit that an industrial user’s discharge need only be “‘a
cause’ of the POTW’s NPDES permit violation, even though another
factor, such as the POTW’s operation difficulties . . . are independent
causes of such violation . . . .”162
III. DALTON UTILITIES AND THE DWSWA ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The governmental entities (Dalton Utilities and the DWSWA)
contended that they were entitled to sovereign immunity as to the
plaintiff’s state-law nuisance claim.163 Dalton Utilities based its
contention on a 2014 Supreme Court of Georgia decision164 where the
court appeared to hold that the so-called “nuisance exception” to
sovereign immunity was limited to claims for eminent domain or
inverse condemnation where the government would be expected to pay
compensation for property.165 The plaintiff countered with authority
prior to 2014 that allowed plaintiffs to bring nuisance claims against
local governments.166
The court noted that a decision by the Supreme Court of Georgia in
Gatto v. City of Statesboro167 was issued following the hearing on the

159. Id. at *87.
160. Id. at *83.
161. Id. at *86–87.
162. Id. at *87 (quoting Arkansas Poultry Fed’n v. U.S.E.P.A., 852 F.2d 324, 238 (8th
Cir. 1988)).
163. Id. at *113–14.
164. Dept. of Nat. Resources v. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, 294 Ga. 593, 755 S.E.2d
184 (2014).
165. Johnson, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197688, at *113 (citing Dept. of Nat. Resources,
294 Ga. at 600, 755 S.E.2d at 190).
166. Id. at *114–15.
167. 312 Ga. 164, 860 S.E.2d 713 (2021).

2022

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1211

motions in the present case.168 Based on Gatto, the district court in
Johnson (the present case) concluded that “as it stands now, [Georgia]
law allows for a nuisance claim against a municipality for injury to
property (or the use and enjoyment thereof) or personal injury.”169 The
court then cited Georgia law for the rule that
To be held liable for maintenance of a nuisance, the municipality
must be chargeable with performing a continuous or regularly
repetitious act . . . which causes . . . hurt, inconvenience[,] or injury;
[and] the municipality must have knowledge or be chargeable with
notice of the dangerous condition . . . .170

Based on this rule, the court concluded that the plaintiff stated a
claim for nuisance against Dalton Utilities for the “‘continuous or
regularly repetitious act’ of discharging PFAS into the Conasauga River
for years, with full knowledge and awareness of its consequences, and
failing to act to remedy this dangerous condition.”171
The court also concluded that the DWSWA could not establish at the
motion to dismiss phase that it was entitled to sovereign immunity.172
The court noted that whether an entity like the DWSWA, which is a
quasi-governmental authority created pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 12-8-50,173 is entitled to sovereign immunity is an issue of first
impression under Georgia law.174 The DWSWA argued that because it is
a creation of the City of Dalton and Whitfield County, both of which
have sovereign immunity, it should similarly be entitled to sovereign
immunity. However, the court noted that the law was not clear that an
authority should be treated similarly to a local government.175 Further,
no law exists in Georgia to show whether an authority like the DWSWA
is a “department or agency of the state” such that it would have
sovereign immunity under the Georgia Constitution.176 Beyond
determining whether the DWSWA is entitled to sovereign immunity in
the first place, the court noted that the plaintiff had raised a number of
“legitimate” arguments that the DWSWA had waived that immunity,

168. Johnson, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197688, at *118–19.
169. Id.
170. Id. at *119 (quoting Mayor of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga. 419, 426, 249 S.E.2d
224, 229 (1978)).
171. Id. at *120.
172. Id. at *122.
173. O.C.G.A. § 12-8-50 (1990).
174. Johnson, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197688, at *126.
175. Id. at *130–31.
176. Id. at *127 (discussing GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(e)).

1212

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

which in some cases would require additional factual support through
discovery and thus should not be addressed in a 12(b)(6) motion.177
IV. THE SUPPLIER DEFENDANTS DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO THE PLAINTIFF
TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION BY PFAS OF ROME’S DRINKING WATER
Although the court concluded that the other defendants did owe a
duty for the purposes of the plaintiff’s negligence claim to the plaintiff
with respect to the contamination, the court concluded that the
Supplier Defendants did not.178 The court explained that the PFAS
suppliers “are not alleged to have polluted the water themselves[,]
[r]ather, they are alleged to have supplied the chemicals[,]” that were
used by the Manufacturing Defendants and disposed of in a manner
that polluted the water.179 The plaintiff could not “point to any
authority from Georgia establishing a duty on the part of a chemical
supplier to protect an unknown third-party, rather than its consumer,
from harm resulting from the negligent use or disposal of the
chemical.”180
V. THE PLAINTIFF STATED A CLAIM FOR PUBLIC NUISANCE AGAINST ALL
DEFENDANTS
“The essential element of nuisance is control over the cause of the
harm.”181 In addition, “some Georgia courts have emphasized that, in
the case of a continuing nuisance, to be liable, the defendant must at
least have a ‘legal right’ to terminate the cause of the injury.”182 Finally,
“[w]here the element of control is met, knowledge of a dangerous
situation and a failure to remedy that situation within a reasonable
time can result in a legal nuisance.”183
The plaintiff alleged that the Manufacturing Defendants and the
DWFWS knowingly discharged PFAS to the Dalton POTW.184 Further,
the plaintiff alleged that these defendants “have the legal right and
ability to abate the nuisance but have failed” to do so.185 For example,
177. Id. at *128–29.
178. Id. at *144–46.
179. Id. at *146.
180. Id. at *147.
181. Id. at *172 (quoting Grinold v. Farist, 284 Ga. App. 120, 122, 643 S.E.2d 253, 255
(2007)).
182. Id. at *174 (citing Kenner v. Addis, 61 Ga. App. 40, 43, 5 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1939)).
183. Id. at *176 (citing Horton v. City of Macon, 144 Ga. App. 380, 382, 241 S.E.2d 311,
314 (1977)).
184. Id. at *177–78.
185. Id. at *180.
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the court explained that the defendants could have found alternative
ways to dispose of their wastewater, built a specialized water treatment
plant for the carpet industry, or ceased to use PFAS in the process.186
Thus, “[a]t this stage, Plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently allege the
control and causation required to state a claim for nuisance.”187
The court also concluded that the plaintiff stated a claim for nuisance
against the Supplier Defendants.188 The plaintiff alleged that these
defendants sold and supplied PFAS chemicals “while knowing of the
downstream contamination” and also knowing “that the PFAS cannot
be removed from Dalton Utilities’ POTW or removed prior to discharge
into” surface waters.189 As to a product supplier’s connection to liability
for a nuisance created or maintained by a user of the product, the court
pointed to Georgia precedent where the Court of Appeals of Georgia
held that where “gas is supplied with actual knowledge on the part of
the one supplying it of the defective and dangerous condition of the
customer’s appliances [for example, underground storage tanks that
had leaked], he is liable for injuries caused by . . . the gas.”190 The court
also accepted that the plaintiff alleged the Supplier Defendants could
have abated the nuisance, analogizing to a claim where a Georgia trial
court ruled that the State of Georgia stated a claim for public nuisance
against suppliers of opioid drugs because the suppliers controlled the
drugs before they were distributed and “had the power to shut off the
supply . . . to lessen or prevent the harm that was occurring.”191

186. Id.
187. Id. at *180–81.
188. Id. at *189–90.
189. Id. at *191–192.
190. Id. at *192 (citing Citizens & Southern Trust Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 192
Ga. App. 499, 500–01, 385 S.E.2d 426, 428–29 (1989)).
191. Id. at *193–94 (citing State of Georgia v. Teva Pharmaceutical Indus. Ltd., 19-A00060-4 (Gwinnett Cnty. Sup. Ct. Oct. 9, 2019)).

